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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
AN APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO, JUDGE 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. THE APPELLANT KLAS HAS MARSHALED HIS EVIDENCE AND BY DOING 
SO HAS SHOWN, AS WELL AS HAVING MET HIS BURDEN, THAT THE 
EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CON-
CLUSIONS MADE BY THE COURT. 
B. NOT ONLY DOES SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE EXIST TO SUPPORT THE 
POSITION OF KLAS, AND THUS REFUTE THE POSITION OF THE COURT, 
BUT IN FACT VIRTUALLY NO EVIDENCE EXISTS THAT SUPPORTS THE 
COURT'S FINDINGS AND THE VAN WAGONERS' INTERPRETATION 
THEREOF. 
C. THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES MUST BE ADDRESSED, THE FINDINGS OF THE 
COURT NOT BEING SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD. 
D. THE APPELLANT KLAS IS ENTITLED TO HIS ATTORNEY'S FEES, BOTH 




THE APPELLANT KLAS HAS MARSHALED HIS EVIDENCE AND BY 
THAT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS HIS POSITION THAT THE COURT WAS 
IN ERROR IN ITS DECISION AND THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT 
ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD. 
It should be stated at the outset that the Appellant Klas 
has set forth in his brief a detailed statement of the facts, 
with repeated references to the record and transcript, in both 
his Statement of Facts as well as his Argument. Repeated 
references are made as to the findings made by the court, how 
those findings were later amended and in what respects, the tes-
timony relied upon with regard to such findings, the exhibits 
used, and the authorities relied upon by the court in formulating 
its Findings of Fact which we here contest. In his arguments, 
Mr. Klas has repeatedly referenced the record and the transcript, 
and has indicated where he believes the court has erred, as well 
as those facts which support the findings. Clearly, Mr. Klas 
does not disagree with all of the court's findings and equally as 
clear is the fact that Mr. Klas has cited numerous references to 
facts which support correctly the findings made by the court. 
It should be further noted that the actions by Klas in his 
brief appear to be substantially different than those of the Ap-
pellant in Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P2d 927 (Utah, 1990), which 
case the Van Wagoners rely upon in their argument that Klas has 
not marshaled his evidence. Clearly, Klas agrees with most of 
the court's findings, and has done more than " . . . merely argue 
that there is evidence contradicting them. . . .M (Ibid., at 
931.) Indeed, the Appellant's Brief is replete with references 
to the findings and supporting facts. 
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We also draw the Court's attention to the fact that the 
cross-appeal of the Van Wagoners1 does no more to marshal the 
evidence than does the Appellant, allegedly- Indeed, we submit 
that their efforts to marshal are substantially less than those 
of the Appellant. 
Furthermore, while the appellate courts of this state talk 
about marshaling, we find guidelines given as to exactly what is 
expected, or at what point a party has crossed the line in 
providing sufficient evidence to constitute marshaling. We sub-
mit that given the lack of any such guidelines, and what we 
believe is a substantial effort and full compliance by Mr. Klas, 
the Van Wagoners1 argument that we have not marshaled the 
evidence is without merit. 
Finally, we submit that the nature of the proceedings in 
this action really require a complete reading of the entire 
transcript by any appellate court. This is not a case with 
redundant testimony, or endless witnesses testifying as to ex-
traneous matters. The witnesses are few, primarily involve the 
parties to the action, and their testimony must be reviewed in 
detail to really obtain a clear understanding of the evidence 
which both supports and contradicts the findings of the court. 
Given these facts it would be impossible to marshal all of the 
supporting testimony. Such a task would require many pages of 
references and quotations from the transcript, and citations to 
the testimony and record. This would only create a burdensome 
brief and would, in all likelihood, only serve to confuse rather 
than clarify or marshal the facts supporting the findings. 
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We, therefore, submit that we have met the marshaling re-
quirement, and in fact, have done so to a much greater extent 
that the Appellees themselves in their cross-appeal brief. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL CLEARLY SUPPORTS THE 
POSITION OF KLAS, DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF THE 
COURT, NOR THE POSITION OF VAN WAGONERS, AND THEREFORE, 
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
Central to the argument by Van Wagoners is their contention 
that the Devere Kent appraisal was purposely kept from them, and 
had they known of its existence they would never have bought the 
home. In support of this position, they cite Amended Findings, 
No. 30 (R. 305), which states as follows: 
"In the course of negotiations between the defendants and 
Carol Klas, there existed the Devere Kent appraisal valuing 
the property at $165,000, the existence of which was unknown 
to defendants, and if known, would have made a material dif-
ference in their offer to buy the subject property. This 
was a unilateral mistake on the part of the defendants which 
was fundamental and substantial. The Devere Kent appraisal 
was never provided by Carol Klas in spite of defendants1 re-
quest for copies of appraisals. In this regard, the Court 
does not find any fraud or misrepresentation on the part of 
the Plaintiff." 
It is interesting, however, to note that the Van Wagoners 
have cited virtually no references to the trial testimony to sup-
port this finding by the court. In fact, they cite only five (5) 
references to the transcript in their entire argument relative to 
the central issue. 
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Reference Number One. They allege that Mrs. Van Wagoner 
testified that during her first contact with Mrs. Klas she in-
quired as to the existence of any appraisals. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 
148.) This is true. 
Reference Number Two. They claim Carol Klas told Van 
Wagoners that she had three "appraisal", and that those 
"appraisals" indicated a value of somewhere between $170,000 to 
". . . $190 -- 1 or 3 or something, but it was above 190, but 
just a little above 190." (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 181-182.) {They cite 
volume II in their first reference but mean volume I.} This is 
also true, as far as it goes. But there are important qualifying 
facts that need to be mentioned as well. 
First is the issue of what Mrs. Klas defined as an 
"appraisal". It is clear from the testimony that she considered 
an appraisal anything from anyone that reflected their opinion of 
the value of the property. (Keep in mind that she was not ex-
perienced in real estate, was not a real estate agent, and saw 
herself as ". . . involved in a decorative, more of a facilitator 
way . . (Tr. Vol. II p. 90, Lines 9-10.) She mentioned 
"appraisals", but it is clear that she had no real idea what an 
actual "appraisal" consisted of. 
In her testimony, she describes the "appraisals" as follows: 
"And I had mentioned that Mr. Payne of American Savings and 
Loan had seen the home a year before and had drawn up some 
type of a letter and had given this to Mr. Klas." (Tr. Vol. 
II, p. 90, lines 18-21.) * * * * 
"Howard Badger (ph.) had given an opinion to John, which 
John had shared with me. Vic Ayers had given an opinion to 
John. He had been through the home. 
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"And I believe there was one other opinion that had been 
raised, plus the fact that -- I just can't recall. I think 
there was one other opinion. . . . " (Tr. Vol. II, p. 91, 
lines 4-11.)" 
The court's own findings (Finding No. 20, R. 302) 
states: 
"However, defendants negotiated with plaintiff through Carol 
Klas pursuant to paragraph 4 above and pursuant to plaintiff 
and Carol Klas1 understanding the range would be the value 
of the three highest "appraisals". (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, we see that Carol Klas referred to four appraisals, to 
wit: that of Mr. Payne, Howard Badger, Vic Ayers and " . . . one 
other opinion . . . ." The Court, itself, found that the range 
would be based upon the three highest appraisals, (R. 299, Find-
ing No. 20) and the term appraisals was in quotes ("appraisals"), 
implying that the term was used loosely and primarily was used 
according to what Carol Klas understood an appraisal to be. (R. 
299, Finding No. 7.) It was found that it was dispute as to 
whether there were written appraisals. (R. 299, Finding No. 7.) 
Reference Number 3. They refer to the allegation that Carol 
Klas " . . . told the Van Wagoners that those appraisals indicated 
the home had an appraisal market value of somewhere between 
$175,000 to $192,000." (Appellee's brief, p. 17). The court 
found that John and Carol Klas were basing their asking price in 
part on the three highest appraisals, and bear in mind the Defen-
dants' conclusions and argument on this matter rest on the 
limited knowledge and understanding of Carol Klas, not only as to 
the nature of an appraisal, but generally what was being used to 
support the value. 
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Carol Klas testified that she ". . . did not know a great 
deal about the background of hoe he {John Klas} arrived at this 
but I could share with him what John had told me." (Tr. Vol. II, 
p. 90, lines 10-12. ) 
Kathryn Van Wagoner testified as follows: 
"Q. In that visit to the home, did the subject of ap-
praisals come up? 
"A. Yes. Once again, we asked, 'Do you have any 
appraisals?1 She had a fact sheet but from that time, that 
initial time she let us know that John had the mechanics of 
the deal. He had the paperwork. 
I understood that Carol was interested in selling the 
house. I did not know that they were getting a divorce un-
til she told me the night before. So, obviously the situa-
tion was a delicate one, and she was cooperative and help-
ful. But she said, 'You will have to talk to Mr. Klas. Mr. 
Klas has those papers. I don't have access to any of those. 
John has relayed this information to me and I am just tell-
ing you what I know.'" (Emphasis added.) (Tr. Vol. II, p. 
150-151, lines 20-25, and 1 to 7.) 
It was clear that she didn't have a great deal of background 
knowledge and that if they wanted more information on MappraisalH 
they would have to obtain that from Mr. Klas. All she was going 
on was what Mr. Klas had told her. The court found that "at no 
time did the plaintiff make any misrepresentations to defendants 
regarding any appraisal made on the property and no misun-
derstanding existed on the part of the plaintiff with reference 
to the nature and extent of any appraisals. . . . " (R. 304, Find-
ing No. 26) We refer the Court to pages 11 through 20 of Vol. I, 
Transcript of Proceedings, wherein the Court will find that not 
only did Mr. and Mrs. Klas rely upon these three "appraisal", but 
an abundance of other factors and information which Mr. Klas used 
to help determine the value of the property. Indeed, Mrs. Klas 
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at one point expressed her concern that she thought his suggested 
asking price of $175,000 to $180,000 was too low- (Tr. Vol. I, p. 
19, lines 1-2) 
Reference Number 4- They refer to Tr. Vol. II, p. 42, lines 
1-14, which reference they use to support their allegation that 
the Klas1 had M. . . kept hidden . . . " (Appellees1 brief, p. 17) 
the Devere Kent appraisal. (Emphasis added.) However, this one 
reference in no way supports such an allegation. There is ab-
solutely nothing whatsoever in the entire transcript of proceed-
ings, nor anything at all in the record which supports their al-
legation that the Kent appraisal was ever hidden, or in any way 
or manner kept from the Van Wagoners. 
Indeed, the Findings of Fact made by the court, cited above, 
clearly point out that at no time did Mr. Klas ever misrepresent 
anything to the Van Wagoners, nor was there ever any misun-
derstanding on the part of Mr. Klas as to the nature or extent of 
any appraisals. (R. 304, Finding No. 26) One must also note the 
chronological context in which the Van Wagoner appraisal requests 
were made. Their requests were made after Van Wagoners had made 
their offer on the home, after the Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
was signed by both parties, and after Van Wagoners had had every 
opportunity to — first, either ask for any "appraisal" which Mr. 
Klas had, or in the alternative, obtain their own. They chose to 
do neither. What they did do, however, is both interesting and 
instructive as to their supposed reliance upon any appraisals. 
This is illustrated by the testimony of Mrs. Klas as to what ac-
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tions the Van Wagoners took to examine, inspect and become ac-
quainted with the home, prior to the offer. We refer the Court 
to the following testimony of Mrs. Klas: 
MQ. Did there come a point in time subsequent thereto 
when you were later contacted by the Van Wagoners relative 
to the presentation of a formal offer? 
"A. Oh, yes. 
"Q. When did that happen? 
"A. This would have been, I would say a few days after 
the 26th. {Of July} 
MQ. In the interim, before you met with them, did any-
thing happen from the standpoint of people coming to the 
home to go through it in behalf of the Van Wagoners, such as 
architects or people of that nature? 
MA. Yes, a series of people. I mean, there seemed to 
be people like electricians, architects, decorators, a whole 
series." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 94, lines 8-21.) 
And what did they do after the offer had been accepted? 
Again, we refer the Court to the testimony of Mrs. Klas. 
"And I said, fWell, will there be anyone coming over to look 
at the property?1 And I think in my mind I was going back 
to my own experience of having someone from a bank when you 
are taking a loan to come in and look at in an appraisal 
situation. 
"And she said, 'No, go ahead. We have no trouble with that. 
I don't believe there will be anyone coming.'" (Tr. Vol. 
II, p. 104, line 4-11.) (Emphasis added.) 
From these testimony examples alone, it is clearly evident 
that the Van Wagoners had every opportunity to either have the 
home appraised on their own, or inspect any "appraisals" in the 
possession of Mr. Klas. They did neither. They saw fit to have 
architects in, decorators, and all kinds of other people, but 
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never anyone to appraise the home to verify its value. The home 
was clearly open for their use by such experts, but they never 
availed themselves of the opportunity. 
And finally on this point, we cannot emphasize enough the 
mischaracterization by the Van Wagoners in their brief that Mr. 
Klas had "kept hidden" any appraisal. Indeed, this allegation 
flies directly in the face of the very clear findings of the 
court. The court found no fraud, no misrepresentations, not even 
a misunderstanding on the part of the Klas'. Their allegation of 
hidden appraisals is simply not true, and unsupported by a single 
reference in the record or their brief. 
Their fifth and final reference to the transcript of 
proceedings refers to Vol. I, p. 181, lines 19-25, and p. 182, 
lines 1-12. This testimony by Mrs. Klas states that, according 
to the best of her knowledge, which was admittedly limited, Mr. 
Klas had three "appraisal" ranging from $170,000 to a little over 
$190,000. This is true. He did have three "appraisals", or 
perhaps statements would be more accurate, with this range of 
values. But she never said these were the only appraisals he 
had. She also stated Mr. Klas wouldn't take anything outside 
this range. This is also true. As she indicated, mr. Klas was 
M
. . . looking for a very substantial offer." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 
185, line 5.) 
But we must remember that a person is entitled to ask any-
thing he or she wishes for the sale of their property, and can 
rely upon anything that he or she may wish in formulating a sales 
price. We have already noted above that Mr. Klas testified at 
10 
length, in page after page of testimony from the transcript cited 
above, as to the many factors that he considered in determining 
the value. There is no indication that the relied solely upon 
these three "appraisals". Anyone familiar with real estate ap-
praisals knows full well that you can have many difference ap-
praisers and come up with many different values. Mr. Klas never 
hid the Ken appraisal. He obviously didn't feel it accurately 
reflected the true value of the property. He did not rely upon 
it in determining his asking price. It may have been too dated, 
it may have been used for other purposes initially, or it simply 
in his mind, based upon the abundant other information he relied 
upon, did not accurately reflect the value of the home. He had 
three "appraisals" and he was entitled to rely upon them. The 
fact situation does not mandate that Mr. Klas reveal every ap-
praisal ever done on the home. 
Our Supreme Court has stated in the case of Park Valley 
Corp. v. Baaley, 635 P2d 65,67 (Utah, 1981), that: 
"The trial court's ruling runs counter to an important prin-
ciple which is a common thread running through many of the 
decisions of this Court. That principle is that sellers and 
buyers should be able to contract on their own terms without 
the indulgence of paternalism by the courts in the allevia-
tion of one side or another from the effects of a poor bar-
gain. They should be permitted to enter into contracts that 
may actually be unreasonable or which may lead to hardship 
on one side." 
Mr. Klas chose from a variety of elements to determine his 
sale price, the three highest "appraisals" being among them. 
These were his terms. These formed the basis for his asking 
price, as well as his acceptance of the Van Wagoner offer. This 
11 
now brings us to one very critical point that has never been ad-
dressed by the Van Wagoners in their brief, and that is the "no 
exceptions" provision of the contract between the parties. 
The court in its Findings (R. 303, Finding No. 23) found 
that: 
"The defendants knew that the plaintiff would not approve of 
any 'conditions1 or 'exceptions1 to the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement at the time of its execution and delivery to the 
plaintiff and were advised that if they desired to purchase 
the property, the purchase would have to be on the basis 
that there were no contingencies, exceptions, or conditions 
of sale other than as set forth in the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement." 
This finding is borne out by various points of testimony. 
For example, in Mr. Van Wagoner's testimony at Tr. Vol. I, p. 
196, lines 5-8, he testified as follows: 
MA. * * * I mean, it was intended to be a no exception of-
fer for $175,000.00. 
"Q. And that's what you intended. 
"A. Yes." 
Given this fact, that the agreement, event the offer in and 
of itself, were intended to be without exceptions or conditions, 
we can only ask why any appraisal is relevant to the case. If 
the Van Wagoners intended their offer or the agreement to be sub-
ject to any conditions whatsoever, including the existence, ex-
amination or accuracy of any "appraisals", regardless of their 
nature, then that condition or exception should have been made a 
part of the agreement. 
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It is manifestly clear that the Earnest Money Sales Agree-
ment constituted an integrated contract, and parol evidence is 
admissible only to show circumstances under which the agreement 
was made, or if there is a showing of fraud (which the court ex-
pressly found to be absent {R. 305, Finding No. 28}), or some 
similar exception which permits the use of parol evidence. See 
for instance Bullfrog Marina v. Lentz, 501 P2d 266 (Utah, 1972). 
No such exception is present in this case. Indeed, it is ad-
mitted by the Van Wagoners that they knew full well that there 
were to be no exceptions or conditions, and prior to signing the 
agreement, they had every opportunity, as found by the court, to 
investigate the issue of fair market value of the property. (R. 
303, Finding No. 22) 
From all of this, several things are clear. The Van 
Wagoners1 brief only cites five (5) factual references, most of 
which have little real meaning, and which lend little or no but-
tressing to their position. Carol Klas admittedly had little 
knowledge of real estate or the "appraisals". Mr. Klas did use 
the three highest "appraisals", as well as a plethora of other 
elements in determining the value of his property. The Van 
Wagoners had every opportunity to examine the appraisals, or have 
the property independently appraised prior to their signing the 
agreement. They did nothing. They knew full well that the offer 
and the final, accepted agreement were without exceptions or con-
ditions of any sort. Mr. Klas was free to choose whatever fac-
tors he desired in determining his asking and acceptance prices, 
and absent some type of fraud or misrepresentation the agreement 
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should stand. Furthermore, the court specifically found no mis-
representations of any sort, no fraud, and that the Van Wagoners 
had every opportunity to appraise the property or examine the ap-
praisals prior to signing the agreement. As stated, they did 
neither. 
The Van Wagoners1 brief specifically alleges that the ap-
praisals were hidden from them. But this is not true, is unsup-
ported and contrary to the evidence and the findings of the 
court. 
This brings us to the next requirement to maintain a defense 
based upon unilateral mistake, that being that Mthe mistake must 
be of so grave a consequence that to enforce the contract as ac-
tually made would be unconscionable." Grahan v. Gregory, 800 P2d 
320, at 326, (Utah App. 1990). We have already mentioned the 
Park Valley case, wherein the Supreme Court ruled that a fair 
amount of latitude should be permitted to parties entering into 
contracts, free from the intrusions and "paternalism" of the 
courts. In light of the Grahan and Park Valley cases, we submit 
that the showing of severity of consequences should be so extreme 
that the contract is unconscionable on its face, or in light of 
even the most obvious or readily available facts. 
Much has been made of the allegedly "missing" Devere Kent 
appraisal for $165,000. (R. 305, Finding No. 30) The agreed upon 
sales price was for $175,000. We question whether a $10,000 dif-
ference between the sales price and one "appraisal" could be 
termed "grave" or "unconscionable"? It cannot. And this is so 
particularly in light of the price of the home and the fact that 
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there was an abundance of other evidence valuing the property 
higher. But let's assume, for argument's sake, that the Kent ap-
praisal was the only one existing. It is clear from the whole 
testimony of not only Mrs. Klas, but both of the Van Wagoners as 
well, that these people wanted the home, and they wanted it 
badly. Mr. Van Wagoner is an attorney, and has experience in 
real estate law, and had been the owner of a home himself. Cer-
tainly, he had some idea in his mind as to whether or not his of-
fering price fell within the general realm of what the home might 
be worth. Given this highly probable knowledge on the part of 
both of the Van Wagoners, they made the offer, asked for no ap-
praisals, and entered into a no exceptions or conditions contract 
without having the property first appraised, or the "appraisals" 
examined. The fact of the matter is that the sales price is not 
unconscionable. The court specifically found that the Van 
Wagoners " . . . considered the price of $175,000 as being a 
reasonable price for the property. . . .M (R. 305, Finding No. 
31) What the court never found or concluded was that the dif-
ference in the $175,000 contract price and the Devere Kent ap-
praisal, or any other for that matter, constituted grave cir-
cumstances, the enforcement of which would be unconscionable. 
This finding being absent, the Van Wagoners have clearly failed 
to fulfill one of the requirements established by this Court to 
sustain a defense of unilateral mistake. They merely mention in 
their brief (P. 19) that it would be unconscionable to enforce 
the contract, but cite no reasoning or authority to sustain such 
a conclusion. 
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Furthermore, we question the court's finding that the three 
"appraisals" ranged from $175,000 and up as found by the court. 
(R. 299, Findings No. 5 & 7) There is abundant testimony that 
from at least the Van Wagoners' and Carol Klas' understanding, 
the appraisals ranged from $170,000 and up, and not $175,000. 
(See, for example, Tr. Vol. I, p. 93, line 18; p. 181, line 25; 
Vol. II, p. 22, lines 17-18; Vol. I, p. 181, lines 19-25, and p. 
182, lines 1-12.) If they understood the range to start at 
$170,000, we question even more strongly how the Kent appraisal 
at $165,000 could be considered an unconscionable and substantial 
difference. 
We also draw the court's attention to the testimony of Mr. 
Van Wagoner at Tr. Vol. II, p. 63, lines 17-21, wherein he indi-
cates that there had been a proposal subsequent to the subject 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement wherein Mr. Klas had offered to 
sell the subject property for $161,000; $4,000 below the $165,000 
Devere Kent "appraisal" as found by the court. (R. 298, Finding 
No. 5) Given this testimony, we question how the court could find 
that had the Van Wagoners known of the Devere Kent appraisal it 
". . . would have made a material difference in their offer to 
buy the subject property. This was a unilateral mistake on the 
part of the defendants which was fundamental and substantial." 
(R. 305, Finding No. 30) The credibility of their position is 
further weakened by the testimony of Mr. Van Wagoner at Tr. Vol. 
II, pp. 71-72, lines 1-25 of P. 71 and lines 1-7 of p. 72, 
wherein he indicates that they weren't interested in the $161,000 
possible sales figure, but, rather, were more concerned, and 
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governed by, their own independent appraisal of $173,000. We 
submit that the court was in error, therefore, in making a find-
ing that the lack of knowledge of the Kent appraisal had a 
material impact upon their desire to buy the home. How can this 
be when they even refused a possible sale below that of the Kent 
appraisal? We further submit that the difference between the 
Kent appraisal and the sales price, as well as the difference be-
tween the Kent appraisal and the lowest appraisal as the Van 
Wagoners apparently understood it, ($170,000) were not of such a 
difference to be considered in any way unconscionably palatable. 
They must also show that the mistake occurred ". . . not-
withstanding the exercise of ordinary diligence by the party 
making the mistake." Grahan v. Gregory, supra, at 327. Their 
sole reply to this critical element was one sentence (Appellees' 
brief, p. 19), wherein they assert that " . . . the mistake oc-
curred despite defendants* requests for appraisals which would 
have avoided the mistake." This is wrong. Nowhere in the 
transcript of proceedings is there any indication that the Van 
Wagoners attempted to obtain the "appraisals" at any point in 
time prior to their executing the Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
with Mr. Klas. We refer the Court, for example, to the testimony 
of Mr. Van Wagoner at Tr. Vol. II, pp. 18-23, wherein he 
describes the offering and acceptance process the parties went 
through. There are other places where such testimony is present, 
but this will serve to indicate that the Van Wagoners never made 
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an effort to obtain and examine any "appraisals" prior to their 
submitting their offer. They never made any effort to have the 
property independently appraise, or otherwise determine if the 
asking price was in keeping with the apparent or true value of 
the home. 
Furthermore, the Van Wagoners had lived in the same neigh-
borhood since July of 1980. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 90, lines 1-2) Mr. 
Van Wagoner had lived in another home with his prior wife which 
they owned that was situated approximately two blocks from the 
subject property (Tr. Vol. II, p. 12, lines 13-15), and he had 
sold that home as a result of his divorce in 1985, and entered 
into the subject agreement in August of 1986. Certainly, once 
could reasonably assume that Mr. Van Wagoner had some idea as to 
the value of properties in the subject neighborhood. Certainly, 
Mr. Van Wagoner must have had some idea as to the value of the 
subject property, whether or not the value fell within what might 
be reasonable for the type of home and the location. With his 
profession, his probable knowledge of real estate values in the 
area, his involvement with real estate law, we find it impossible 
to believe that the Van Wagoners have exercised anything that 
could ever remotely be characterized as ordinary diligence. 
When Mr. Van Wagoner was asked why he hadn't inserted any 
conditions into the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, he replied 
that he had two reasons. The first was that since he and Mrs. 
Klas had both been through divorces he trusted her as to the ap-
praisal values (keeping in mind that she had in fact been in-
formed that there were three "appraisals" in the range she indi-
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cated to the Van Wagoners), and second, Mr. Klas was a difficult 
person to work with. We submit that these are not sufficient ex-
cuses. We submit that these reasons do not rise to the level or 
ordinary diligence, particularly with any an attorney who had 
lived in the same neighborhood for six years and within a few 
blocks of the subject property. 
The final issue to prove unilateral mistake involves the 
necessity of placing the other party in status quo as he stood 
prior to the agreement, except for the loss of his bargain. They 
assert that the Appellant, Mr. Klas, was placed in a status quo 
position because the contract had been rescinded and he was in 
the same position as he had been prior to the agreement. First, 
they are in error in contending that the agreement had been re-
scinded. The court made no such finding and they cite absolutely 
no authority or finding by the court to substantiate this posi-
tion. What the court found was unilateral mistake, and not res-
cission. 
Secondly, as we pointed out in our initial brief, had the 
agreement been honored by Van Wagoners, Mr. Klas would only have 
had to pay a 3% finder's fee to his former wife. But due to 
their breach, he had to subsequently pay a 7% real estate commis-
sion, resulting in an additional loss of $5,950, which amount we 
are seeking in additional damages from this Court. 
CONCLUSION OF POINT II 
While our discussion has been lengthy, we feel it has been 
necessary to illustrate where the findings and the position of 
Van Wagoners lack credible evidence to support their positions. 
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Their entire position rests on the court's finding of unilaterla 
mistake. We have gone through each [point and shown that they 
have failed to factually support any of the points necessary to 
prove unilateral mistake. These people knew what they were 
doing, or should have known, the difference between the sales 
price the Kent appraisal is not of an unconscionable nature, they 
have failed to exercise ordinary diligence, and they have not 
left Mr. Klas in a status quo position. The only error, if there 
is one, is that they failed to take steps and ask questions that 
would have provided them with information that supposedly might 
have altered their opinion about the home, but event that is con-
jectural. Had they seen the Kent appraisal prior to their offer 
they still may have offered $175,000. It is clear form the 
evidence that they really wanted this home. So much so, in fact, 
that they lost little time in making an offer, and were apprehen-
sive they would not obtain the home prior to another party. Bear 
in mind, as well, that the Kent "appraisal" was not one of the 
three appraisals upon which Mr. Klas was making his offer. 
Indeed, Mr. Klas relied upon a variety of other factors in deter-
mining his asking and acceptance price. In addition, there is 
absolutely no evidence to support their position that the Kent 
appraisal was "hidden" from the Van Wagoners. the court made no 
such finding and the appraisal was eventually provided sometime 
shortly after the requests by Mr. Van Wagoner, which requests and 
the providing of the "appraisal" both came after the agreement 
had been signed by the parties. 
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Finally, it cannot be overlooked that the offer made was in-
tended to be, and was required to be, without exceptions or con-
ditions. This being the case we fail to see how any appraisals 
at that point could be relevant. Accordingly, we submit that the 
court erred in ruling that unilateral mistake had occurred that 
would permit the Van Wagoners from escaping their responsibility 
under the subject agreement between the parties. 
POINT III 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ITS INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF 
DAMAGES, AND IN THE EVENT THIS COURT RULES IN FAVOR OF 
MR. KLAS, THE DAMAGES DUE THE APPELLANT NEED TO BE 
CLARIFIED BY THIS COURT. 
The Van Wagoners1 brief argues that since the court did not 
err, there is no need to reach the issue of damages; but they 
argue that if the Court sees fit to reach that issue in the event 
of a reversal, they claim that the damages claimed are M• • . 
purely speculative. . . . " (Appellees' brief, p. 23.) 
We have already argued that there is no basis for the 
court's award of only $7,500, and its failure to award the dif-
ference that had to be paid in real estate fees for the sale. It 
is readily apparent that had the Van Wagoners bought the home, 
Carol Klas would have been paid a 3% finder's fee, as set forth 
in their Decree of Divorce. This is without dispute, and there-
fore, certainly not in the slightest degree speculative. 
Second, as the court's first Memorandum Decision points out, 
the property sold for $160,000 (R. 143) (see also Tr. Vol. I, p. 
45, lines 3-4) after the Van Wagoners failed to perform, leaving 
a difference in the two sales prices of $15,000. These facts are 
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also undisputed. It is hardly speculative or hypothetical to see 
that the difference between the two sales prices is an exact 
figure, readily ascertainable, and thus the correct measure of 
damages. 
Accordingly, we submit that the damages due in this matter 
is the difference between the sales prices of $15,000, plus the 
difference in the real estate sales fees, or $5,950, for a total 
damage amount to Mr. Klas of $20,950, plus interest. We, there-
fore, request that this Court, in the event it rules in favor of 
Mr. Klas, specify and direct the correct damages due to the Ap-
pellant . 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT, MR. KLAS, IS ENTITLED TO HIS ATTORNEY'S FEES 
FOR THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW, AS WELL AS FEES INCURRED 
FOR THIS APPEAL. 
In the event this Court rules in favor of Mr. Klas, the 
issue of attorney's fees incurred for both the proceedings in the 
lower court and the proceedings before this Court arises as an 
issue and under the terms of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, 
we submit that Mr. Klas is entitled to those fees. Accordingly, 
we request that this Court render as part of its opinion the 
rights of Mr. Klas to attorney's fees in the two different 
proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
We have already spoken at length as to the merits of the 
central issue of the case, that being unilateral mistake. In our 
opinion, the Van Wagoners have clearly failed to fulfill all of 
the requirements of a unilateral mistake defense, bearing in mind 
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that all elements of such a defense must be satisfied. The facts 
do not sustain the critical findings of the court below and we 
submit that the opinion should be reversed. 
We also submit that Mr. Klas is entitled to damages in the 
amounts specified, said amounts being the differences between the 
sales prices and the real estate fees that were involved, versus 
those that would have been present had the Van Wagoners per-
formed. 
Finally, we submit that Mr. Klas is entitled to his 
reasonable costs and attorney's fees for both the lower court 
proceeding and the proceedings before this Court. We feel that 
the issue concerning marshaling of evidence has been adequately 
addressed, and that Mr. Klas has complied fully with that re-
quirement. Certainly as much, in not more so, than the Van 
Wagoners in their own cross appeal. 
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT TO CROSS APPEAL OF APPELLEES 
AN APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO, JUDGE 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In the Appellant's initial brief on appeal, he has already 
set forth his position as to the facts in this case. The Van 
Wagoners have likewise set froth their statement of facts as they 
saw them. Those facts were further elaborated upon in the argu-
ments and Mr. Klas' reply brief. We, therefore, rely upon the 
factual statements as they have already been argued. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. THE ARGUMENTS OF VAN WAGONERS IN THEIR CROSS APPEAL ARE 
FLAWED BECAUSE EACH ONE RELIES UPON THE ASSUMPTION THAT 
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND CAROL KLAS TO BE THE AGENT OF 
JOHN KLAS. 
B. THE ACTIONS OF JOHN KLAS NOT ONLY DID NOT CONSTITUTE FRAUD, 
BUT THEY DIDN'T EVEN RISE TO THE LEVEL OF MISREPRESENTATION. 
C. JOHN KLAS DID NOT MAKE ANY MISREPRESENTATIONS TO THE VAN 
WAGONERS, EITHER PERSONALLY OR THROUGH CAROL KLAS. 
D. THE ARGUMENT OF VAN WAGONERS THAT THERE WAS BOTH FRAUD 
AND UNILATERAL MISTAKE ARE CONTRADICTORY ARGUMENTS. THEY 




CAROL KLAS WAS NOT THE AGENT OF JOHN KLAS AND 
THERE WAS NO FINDING BY THE COURT TO THAT EFFECT. 
Basic to the arguments set forth in the cross appeal of the 
Van Wagoners is their contention that Carol Klas was the agent of 
John Klas, her former husband. The most obvious defect with this 
argument is that the Van Wagoners cite not a single finding by 
the court, point of authority, nor a single reference to the 
transcript that evidences the existence of an agency relation-
ship. 
In our examination of the record and the transcript of 
proceedings, we find no real effort made on the part of the Van 
Wagoners to adduce any evidence or basis to indicate that an 
agency relationship existed. There was no questioning during the 
trial of the witnesses on this point, no argument to this effect 
in the record, and no finding by the court that an agency 
relationship existed. 
It is well settled that an agency relationship exists where 
a party acts for and represents the principal " . . . and who ac-
quires his authority from him. . . . " (2A CJS Agency, Sec. 4, p. 
554.) Our Supreme Court has followed this reasoning, adding 
that: 
"In general, the determinative question has usually been 
posed as one of 'control1, the view being that if the defen-
dant controls, or has the right of control, the manner in 
which the operations are to be carried out, the defendant is 
liable as a master, while, if the control extends only to 
the result to be achieved, the actor is regarded as an inde-
pendent contractor, and the defendant is liable under 
neither respondeat superior nor the workmen's compensation 
statutes." Foster v. Steed, 432 P2d 60, 62 (Utah, 1967). 
From whence, then, did Carol Klas derive her authority to 
sell the home? Not from John Klas. She acquired her authority 
from the court pursuant to the Decree of Divorce. (Tr. Vol. II, 
p. 81, lines 11-12) The only control John Klas had was to accept 
or reject any offers. He didn't even set the sales price. (R. 
298, Finding No. 4) But the right to sell the home and to 
receive a "finder's fee" was granted to Mrs. Klas by the Third 
District Court in the Divorce Decree, and not from John Klas. 
Indeed, John Klas had moved out of the home and Mrs.Klas con-
tinued to reside in the home until the time the Van Wagoners were 
to perform. (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 80-81, lines 21-25 and lines 1-5) 
The Van Wagoners, on the other hand, offer no evidence whatsoever 
as to the existence of an agency relationship. Under the terms 
of the Decree she was granted by the court the right to find a 
buyer and to receive a fee for doing so, with the attendant 
responsibilities and rights to show the home, care for it during 
the time it was up for sale, and in general, to find a buyer. 
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 82, lines 1-13) 
Again, the Van Wagoners offer no evidence, nor do they offer 
any authorities, that would indicate the existence of an agency 
relationship. The Van Wagoners even admitted that they made no 
effort to inquire into the extent of her authority under the 
Decree of Divorce. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 105, lines 10-13) Further-
more, as stated, the court did not find that an agency relation-
ship existed. In fact, the assertions of Van Wagoners of an 
agency relationship are so lacking throughout the proceedings 
that one could virtually claim that the matter has been raised 
for the first time in this cross appeal. 
The net result of this is that John Klas cannot be held 
responsible for the acts of Carol Klas due to the lack of agency, 
this includes the preclusion of a finding of fraud, since he was 
admittedly not involved in any representations or negotiations 
directly and personally with the Van Wagoners. 
It might also be appropriate at this point to reiterate our 
argument in our reply brief as to the issue of marshaling of 
evidence. We find the Van Wagoners1 cross appeal brief to be to-
tally lacking in any effort to marshal evidence. Much less so 
than any efforts made by the Appellant. There is clearly very 
little effort made to set forth factual data from the trial that 
supports their various contentions of agency, fraud, etc. The 
net result of this omission on their part is that they basically 
have nothing more than bare bones allegations concerning all of 
the points made. Their arguments are so lacking in factual and 
legal support that we submit that there is no basis to alter or 
over turn the court's rulings pertaining to the issues of fraud, 
agency, and misrepresentation. 
POINT II 
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR A FINDING OF FRAUD. 
The Van Wagoners cite Finding No. 30 of the Amended Findings 
(R. 305) to support their contention that there had been a false 
representation of a material fact: 
"In the course of negotiations between defendants and Carol 
Klas, there existed the Devere Kent appraisal valuing the 
property at $165,000, the existence of which was unknown to 
the defendants, and if known, would have made a material 
difference in their offer to buy the subject property. * * * 
The Devere Kent appraisal was never provided by Carol Klas 
in spite of defendants1 request for copies of appraisals." 
We are at a loss to see how these actions, if believed and 
take at face value, support a conclusion of fraudulent mis-
representation. We have already pointed out in our prior brief 
that Carol Klas had no real understanding as to the nature of an 
appraisal. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 90) The court even found that it 
remained disputed as to whether or not it was represented that 
written appraisals existed. (R. 299, Finding No. 7) Carol Klas 
also testified that she didn't know a great deal about the back-
ground of the value information, (Tr. Vol. II, p. 90, lines 10-
20), and that she didn't have access to any of the appraisal in-
formation and that she informed Van Wagoners they would have to 
obtain that information from Mr. Klas. (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 150-
151, lines 20-25 and 1-7) 
In light of these facts, i.e., that she informed the Van 
Wagoners that she didn't have a great deal of knowledge about the 
background on the value, and that she didn't have access to any 
appraisal information, and that they would have to obtain this 
from Mr. Klas, how can one claim that she did anything to induce 
them to act based upon false representations, or even omissions. 
They cannot. They knew that the information concerning value was 
in the possession of Mr. Klas, yet they did nothing to try and 
obtain that information prior to signing the papers. 
Furthermore, there is a serious question as to how important 
the appraisal information really was. Mr. Klas, for example, 
testified that: 
"Carol called me and said that Mrs. Van Wagoner had said to 
her that she did not know why we were fooling around with 
all this business of appraisals because that was not 
relevant to the matter and they wanted the home and they 
would appreciate her vacating it as soon as possible." (Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 34, lines 7-12) 
Of critical importance in maintaining a claim of fraud is 
the issue of reasonable reliance. Given all of the above, and 
more, is it any wonder that the court concluded that no mis-
representations had been made, let alone fraud, and based its 
relief to the Van Wagoners solely on the ground of unilateral 
mistake. It is well settled that it is up to the court to deter-
mine whether or not there had been reasonable reliance. 
(Berkeley Bank for Coops, v. Meibos, 607 P2d 798, 801 {Utah, 
1980}.) We have, in our prior reply brief, argued at length con-
cerning the failure of the Van Wagoners to act in a prudent man-
ner before signing the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, and whether 
or not the knowledge of "appraisals" even formed a basis for 
their intent to purchase the home. We have argued concerning the 
other knowledge available to the Van Wagoners relative to 
property values in the neighborhood, the actual representations 
made by Carol Klas to the van Wagoners, their intense desire to 
purchase the home, and other facts that would all indicate a to-
tal lack of fraud or misrepresentation on anyone's part. 
Furthermore, even if the Van Wagoners had obtained the 
"appraisals" from Mr. Klas, it is without dispute that those 
"appraisals" used by Mr. Klas ranged from $170,000 to $192,000. 
If they had spoken with him, he would have informed them__as to 
the range of these appraisal values, the nature of the 
"appraisals" and from whom he had obtained them. The net result 
would have been that the three highest of these "appraisals" did 
in fact have the range Carol Klas had indicated to the Van 
Wagoners. Clearly, there was no deception here. The fact that a 
fourth appraisal, which was not hidden as they claim, lowered the 
range of "appraisals" another $5,000 would not seem to make any 
difference. The bottom line is that John Klas based his value on 
both the three highest "appraisals", as well as the copious other 
facts available to him which we have previously set forth in some 
detail in our other reply brief. 
In their cross appeal brief, the Van Wagoners argue that 
they followed the requirements set forth by the Court in 
Sugarhouse Finance Company v. Anderson, 610 P2d 1369 (Utah, 1980) 
to protect themselves by asking " . . . Carol Klas if there were 
any appraisals on the home." (Cross Brief, p. 25) We submit 
that this simple inquiry does not measure up to the standard re-
quired by the Court. In the Sugarhouse case, the Court, at p. 
1373 states as follows: 
"Misrepresentation may be made either by affirmative state-
ment or by material omission, where there exists a duty to 
speak. Such a duty will not be found where the parties deal 
at arm's length, and where the underlying facts are 
reasonably within the knowledge of both parties. Under such 
circumstances, the plaintiff is obliged to take reasonable 
steps to inform himself, and to protect his own interests." 
This really is the crux of the whole case. Did the Van 
Wagoners, who were without dispute, dealing at arm's length, take 
reasonable steps to inform themselves as to the appraisal values 
and to protect their own interests. They did not. We ask, what 
purpose is there in asking about appraisals, in order to verify 
their existence, their accuracy and other content. A mere in-
quiry does not rise to the level of protecting one's interest, 
particularly when Carol Klas clearly in her testimony indicated 
that she had little knowledge of the nature, number or content of 
any "appraisals", and informed the Van Wagoners they would have 
to obtain that information from Mr. Klas. If that information 
was so critical why did they wait until after the agreement had 
been signed and they were seeking bank financing to ask for the 
appraisals? The answer is that the existence and accuracy of the 
appraisals were not material to the offer, but rather, the Van 
Wagoners only sought them out when it came time to obtain their 
financing in order to avoid the cost of obtaining another ap-
praisal. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 35, lines 13-24) 
In the above referenced testimony, Mr. Van Wagoner makes it 
clear that he only wanted the appraisals for obtaining his loan, 
and was not using them as a basis in determining whether or not 
to make his offer. His offer had already been made and accepted. 
When he could not obtain the appraisals from Mr. Klas as quickly 
as he wanted, he asked the bank about another appraiser and went 
through that person to obtain his appraisal for the bank. 
We see nothing in these actions that would indicate that the 
Van Wagoners were taking steps of any type to inform themselves 
prior to making the offer, and without this information, how can 
they claim they were reasonable in their actions to protect their 
own interests. Furthermore, the Court will note in the entire 
context of Mr. Van Wagoner's dealings with Mr. Klas, that Mr. 
Klas was anything but difficult. While he was unable to provide 
the information as quickly as Mr. Van Wagoner wished, he was 
friendly, and we submit, made a reasonable effort to comply with 
Mr. Van Wagoners* requests for appraisal information, and did in 
fact supply that information* 
From the foregoing, we submit that it is readily apparent 
that there was no fraud by anyone involved with this transaction. 
The central fact is that the Van Wagoners badly wanted the Klas 
home and the existence, content, and accuracy of any appraisals 
was secondary and of little importance. They obviously and ad-
mittedly felt the home was worth what they offered, they had in-
formation upon which to base their knowledge of value other than 
the appraisals, and were more concerned that someone else would 
buy the home before they did. If the home was really worth sub-
stantially less than the $175,000 offered, which we dispute, 
their failure to verify the value can only be characterized as 
recklessness on the Van Wagoners1 part, and not fraud or mis-
representation on the part of Mr. Klas. Negligence on the part 
of the Van Wagoners is the issue here, and not any act or omis-
sion on the part of John Klas or anyone connected with him. 
Their claim for fraud should, therefore, be dismissed and the 
court's finding of a lack of fraud upheld. 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR OVERRULING THE COURT'S RULING 
THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO MISREPRESENTATIONS 
MADE BY JOHN KLAS. 
The Van Wagoners' claim of misrepresentation uses the same 
reasoning as their claim of fraud, and rests entirely upon the 
assumption that Carol Klas was John Klas' agent. We have argued 
already at length that Carol Klas was not his agent. She acted 
virtually independently, derived her authority from the court un-
der the Decree of Divorce, and Mr. Klas1 only involvement was 
whether or not to accept the offers presented to him. There was 
no principal-agent relationship between John and Carol Klas. 
There were no misrepresentations made directly by John Klas. 
They admit, or rather, never even contend, that John Klas ever 
made any factual representations to the Van Wagoners. 
They contend that there was a fourth, much lower appraisal 
which would have altered the Van Wagoners1 decision. This is not 
only conjecture as to the possible influence it might have had, 
but it is not a "much lower" appraisal. The court found the 
range to start at $175,000, but we argued in our other brief that 
the testimony indicated that the range more likely ran from 
$170,00. In either case, the Devere Kent appraisal was $165,000. 
This would make the range $165,000 to $192,000. An offer of pur-
chase at $175,000 is hardly out of line, or to the detriment 
which they have suffered? We contend that there is none. 
They go through the motions of citing to the Court the ele-
ments of fraud and/or misrepresentation, but fail to show how the 
Van Wagoners acted to their detriment. They have failed to show 
that a purchase of $175,000 was so out of line as to be un-
conscionable and thus to their detriment if enforced. 
They also ignore, as cited in our other brief, the fact that 
Carol Klas indicated a possible fourth appraisal. Did they in-
quire into this possible additional appraisal. They did not. 
Did she fail to disclose it? She did not. Was the Kent ap-
praisal much lower? It was not. Was the Kent appraisal among 
the three highest "appraisals" upon which John Klas, in part, was 
relying in determining his selling price? It was not. It was 
made clear that John Klas was relying on the three highest 
"appraisals" in setting his value. We will not belabor these 
points further since they are discussed in much greater detail in 
our other reply brief. Suffice it to say, that the court's 
ruling that there had been no fraud nor any misrepresentation was 
clearly correct, and well supported by the testimony and the ex-
hibits received at trial. 
CONCLUSION 
If there is a failure to marshal evidence in this case, it 
lies with the Van Wagoners. Their support from the transcript 
and record of their cross appeal claims, as well as their rebut-
tal brief, are substantially lacking. Their claims of fraud and 
misrepresentation do not bear up under scrutiny. Carol Klas was 
not John Klas1 agent. They were grossly remiss in their in their 
duty to inquire into the nature and accuracy of the appraisals. 
They did absolutely nothing to protect themselves, proceeded 
quickly to present an offer to stave off the possibility of the 
home being bought by another party, and only finally got around 
to inquiring about the appraisals when they needed them for ob-
taining their loan, and not for the purpose of verifying the 
value of the property, or for the purpose they should have made 
of them, to wit: to aid in establishing and verifying value 
prior to making their offer of purchase. We, therefore, submit 
that their cross appeal relief should be denied, and that the ap-
pellant should be awarded his attorney's fees incurred in 
responding to the Van Wagoners' cross appeal in this matter. 
DATED this day of May, 1991. 
BRANT H. WALL 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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